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Conflicts of Law--Choice of
Law in Torts--A Critique
By Roy MORELAND*
In the changing field of conflicts of law, no topic is more
confused and more difficult than that of choice of law in tort cases.
Historically the law in such cases was simple in statement and ap-
plication-the law of the case was the law of the state where the in-
jury occurred. But in recent years it has become increasingly clear
that this historic rule is an oversimplification. In too many cases,
where a series of acts occurred in several states, it was felt that to
turn the choice of law wholly on the basis of where the injury
occurred was unsatisfactory because this place may have had a
small part in the total circumstances of the case. In line with this
modem thinking, Babcock v. Jackson' was decided in 1963. In
this decision the New York court enunciated a choice of law rule
based on the state having the most significant contacts with the
transaction. A number of courts have followed Babcock, but the
majority still adhere to the old rule.
The net result is that there are now two competing rules as to
choice of law in tort cases.2 Should the law of the place where
the injury occurred or the law of the state having the most signi-
ficant relationship control? The place of injury rule provides
certainty as to the law. Whether the suit is in Nevada or New
York, the same decision would be made as to choice of law. This
is in accord with the fundamental principle that the law should
be objective. Suppose several persons were plaintiffs in separate
suits arising out of a single accident containing several foreign
elements. Under the place of injury rule, the same law would be
*Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; LL.B., Uni-
versity of Kentucky; J.D., University of Chicago; S.J.D., Harvard University Law
School.
1 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
2 See generally 2F. Hmim & F. JAmES, THE LAW, Or ToRTs § 30.4 (1956),
for a discussion of the situation prior to Babcock.
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applied in each case, whether the suit were in Nevada, New York,
or some other jurisdiction. 3 This results in equal justice before the
law, a result to be earnestly hoped for.
On the other hand, if the courts of the several states involved
were able to determine subjectively which state had the most
significant contacts with the chain of events leading to the injury,
it is not only possible but probable that in many cases the law of
different states would be applied in the various suits arising from
the same accident. This encourages litigants to choose the most
favorable jurisdiction in which to sue, making it difficult for
lawyers to advise clients as to the law of the case. It is a clear
invitation to uncertainty and confusion.
In addition, these cases involve the basic premise that a tort
action is a suit for compensation by the defendant for an injury
caused by his wrongful conduct. If there is no injury, there is no
right to recover. For example, suppose that the defendant is reck-
less, but his recklessness causes no injury to the plaintiff. Although
there may be a criminal action for the recklessness, there is no
civil action. It is well that this principle in civil tort cases be
preserved.4
While there may be no recovery for negligence which causes no
injury,5 conversely, injury without negligence is not actionable.6
Each is as significant as the other. Both are essential to a cause of
action and a recovery. The point is that mechanical application
of the law of the place of injury as the controlling factor in a
multi-state tort case is an oversimplification when the conduct
which caused the injury occurred in another state. Perhaps, too
little thought has been given to the place or places of conduct in
determining the law in tort cases. Frequently the place of the in-
jury is merely fortuitous and only a small part of the relevant
circumstances occurred there. As wrongful conduct and injury are
both essential elements of liability, the choice of law is compli-
cated when the law of the state of the conduct and that of the
injury are different. What to do in such a situation is the question.
3 Note, Lex Loci Delecti or Significant Contacts-That is not the Question,
54 Ky. L.J. 728, 733 (1966).
4 H. GOODRICH, CONFLICr OF LAws 263 (3d ed. 1949).
5W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 146 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROS-
SEs]. 6 2 F. HARPERa & F. JA ,s, supra note 2.
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Several cases will be considered that illustrate the problem and
the difficulty.
A case illustrating the place of injury rule is Alabama Great
Southern Railroad Company v. Carroll.7 In that case, the plaintiff
was a brakeman on the defendant's railroad. The defendant was
an Alabama corporation running the railroad from Tennessee
through Alabama into Mississippi. The plaintiff was a resident of
Alabama, the state in which the employment relationship was
entered into. The injury arose out of the negligence of the
defendant's employees in failing to inspect brake couplings in
Alabama. The injury occurred, however, in Mississippi. The court
held that the place of injury rather than that of the negligent con-
duct determined the law of the case, and that the plaintiff had no
cause of action under Mississippi law. If Babcock had been decided
at that time (1892), it is possible that Alabama law would have
been applied under the "most significant contacts" rule since both
parties were residents of Alabama; the plaintiff was hired there,8
and the place of injury was fortuitous in that the negligent cou-
pling had remained in service through several states. However,
the conduct which caused the injury occurred in Alabama. While
it is submitted that it is hardly satisfactory to apply the law of
Mississippi, it is not altogether satisfactory to apply Alabama law.
So neither the state having the most significant relationship nor
the state of injury presents a satisfactory locus for choice of law.
What is the solution?
Two cases will illustrate the simplicity of applying the mechan-
ical place of injury rule, but show its potentially unsatisfactory
result. In the first case, Dallas v. Whitney,9 plate glass stored in
Ohio by the plaintiff was broken by the force of an explosion
caused by the defendant's blasting in West Virginia. The suit was
in West Virginia. The West Virginia court held that the de-
fendant's liability was determined by Ohio law, which imposed
liability without fault.
797 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).8 Alabama law would have been employed if this bad been a worlman's
compensation case. In woranan's compensation cases, the law of the state of the
employer-employee contract governs. Such cases have long been considered an
exception to the place of injury rule. E.g., Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Gerard, 201
Vis. 474, 230 N.W. 622 (1930).
9 118 W.Va. 106, 188 S.E. 766 (1936).
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If the court had been using the Babcock rule and under West
Virginia law the defendant would have been liable only if he had
been negligent,'10 would West Virginia law have been applied?
Ohio would have remained the place of injury, but it is highly
probable that the West Virginia court might well have held that
West Virginia was the state of most significant contact and ap-
plied its own law. In a case where the state of injury has a rule of
liability without fault, the forum, if it has the contrary rule, is
apt to apply its own law and hold its citizen not liable. Thus,
Babcock may furnish a convenient peg upon which to hang the
choice of law, although normally the law of the case would be
that of the place of injury. Conversely, if West Virginia were the
forum, and liability without fault had been its law (the place of
conduct), it is altogether probable that the law of Ohio would
be applied. These examples indicate that Babcock furnishes tie
opportunity for inconsistent results favoring or not favoring con,-
testing parties.
Somewhat similar are the problems inherent in Hunter v.
Derby Foods," which involved an action for wrongful death
brought in a New York federal district court. The deceased died
in Ohio from eating unfit canned food which he had purchased
and eaten in Ohio. The defendant, a New York distributor, had
secured the food from a concern which had canned it in South
America. The defendant sold it to a wholesaler in Ohio who in
turn sold it to the grocer from whom the deceased purchased it.
An Ohio statute made it negligence per se to sell unwholesome
food without disclosure of that fact. The court held that the
plaintiff could recover under the Ohio statute. Here the place of
injury was Ohio, and the result was to hold the defendant
negligent as a matter of law without privity of contract.
Suppose that the place the food was canned imposed strict
liability but Ohio would hold the defendant only if he failed to
exercise due care.12 This would make it hard to determine the
jurisdiction having the most significant relationship, but in such
a case Babcock would almost certainly have not been mentioned in
10 See E. CEAm, E. GmswoLm, W. REESE & M. RosENButrc, CASES AN
MATERLS ON CONFLICr OF LAWs 448 (5th ed. 1964).
11 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940).
12See E. CHEATuAm, E. GRISWOLD, W. REES E & M. RosEN tUR, supra note
10, at 448-49.
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the court's opinion. The "unfit food" cases occupy a separate
category in conflicts law. The states in such cases generally follow
either the majority rule of strict liability or the minority one
which requires lack of due care for liability.13 If, in such a case,
Ohio had the minority rule and decided to repudiate it, as some
sixteen states have done in the last thirty years,14 the court would
have adopted the rationale found in majority state decisions with
no regard to the reasoning in Babcock. This illustrates that Bab-
cock is used only where desired. In too many types of situations
it is not desired. This results in numerous separate categories for
different types of cases, causing a lack of uniform choice of law
rules and debatable rationalizations in support of the various dif-
ferences between these categorized rules. For example, the Re-
statement Second of Conflicts of Laws provides for different rules
in at least seven categories of actionable wrongs, with a dif-
ferent rule for different types of wrongs.15 Over-categorization is
the bane of objectivity in the law.
The lack of objectivity in the Babcock rule, its lack of certainty,
and the opportunity it presents for the judge to show preference
and even prejudice have caused the writer to wonder if the in-
adequacies of the place of injury rule might be better cured by
extending and broadening old, established principles. Schmidt
v. Driscoll Hotel, Incorporated'6 will serve somewhat to illustrate
what is in mind. In that case, liquor was sold to an intoxicated
person in violation of Minnesota's dram shop law. The intoxicated
purchaser drove his car into an adjoining state, Wisconsin, where
he caused injury to the plaintiff. The Minnesota court allowed
recovery under its own statute. Using much the same reasoning
as Babcock, which was not decided until six years later, the court
pointed out that both plaintiff and defendant were residents of
Minnesota, the wrongful conduct of the defendant occurred in
that state, and the purpose of the statute was to punish Minnesota
dram shop keepers who sold liquor to intoxicated persons. Wis-
consin's only connection was that the harm (injury) fortuitously
occurred there.
13 See PROSSER 674-75.
14 Id. at 676.
ISSee RESTATEimNT (SEcOND) OF CoNFxmr OF LAws §§ 379(c)-879(1)
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
16 249 Minn. 876, 82 N.W.2d 865 (1957).
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The writer is not too impressed with the court's reasoning.
Would it not have been possible to have reached the same result
(assuming it advisable) by the use of established tort principles?
The wrongful conduct of the defendant in Minnesota was a con-
tinuing tort which continued without interruption into Wisconsin
and caused the harm of which the plaintiff complained. This
closely follows the reasoning in the squib case, a celebrated de-
cision in tort law.
In that case, 17 the defendant threw a lighted squib, i.e., fire-
cracker, into a stall in a market. Acting in self-defense, the occupier
of the stall it landed in instinctively threw it into another stall,
and so on, until it fell into the plaintiff's stall and exploded causing
the plaintiff to lose an eye. The court held that the acts of the
intermediate occupiers of stalls were instinctive and reflexive, thus
not intervening causes, and that the defendant was responsible for
his act. Since the squib continued to burn as it passed from stall
to stall, his tortious act continued until it culminated in the plain-
tiff's injury. Similarly, the defendant's unlawful act in the dram
shop case continued, without intervention, until the injury oc-
curred in Wisconsin. Admittedly, this reasoning holds the defend-
ant liable in Wisconsin for his unlawful conduct in Minnesota,
but if the law is to change without the aid of Babcock, there must
be extensions in established law. It is submitted that it is in accord
with existing legal reasoning to hold the defendant liable for
his unlawful act in Minnesota, which continued until the injury
in Wisconsin. The courts have been applying the law of the place
of injury; it is theoretically just as sound to apply the law of the
place of conduct. The Restatement Second uses the place of con-
duct as a factor in determining the state of most significant re-
lationship.' 8 The rules governing choice of law cannot be liber-
alized without some changes, and this is one of the suggested re-
forms.
There are other ways historic principles can be extended and
liberalized without adopting the vague, subjective rule in Bab-
cock. For example, the same result reached in Schmidt was reached
in another dram shop case'19 with the same facts. The federal court
17 Scott v. Shepard, 3 Wils. K.B. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1773).
1 8 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, at § 379.
19 Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1959).
[Vol. 56,
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for the Northern District of Illinois held the dram shop owner
liable for the tort, as in Schmidt, but with different reasoning. The
liquor was sold in Illinois, but the resulting injury was in
Michigan. The court, sitting in Illinois, held that although the
Illinois Act was not intended to have extra-territorial effect and
the Michigan Act was not applicable, the Illinois defendant was
liable under Michigan common law. Of course, to reach that re-
sult, it was necessary to hold that the defendant's act in Illinois
continued its intoxicating effect into Michigan where the injury
occurred.
The use of the continuing act principle to hold a defendant
liable for an injury in a second state is ordinarily used where the
act was unlawful in the initiating state. However, the defendant
may also be liable where the act was unlawful only in the state
where the injury occurred. But this calls for a shift in reasoning.
-Thus, in Steele v. Bulova TVatch Company,20 a citizen and resident
of the United States purchased Swiss watch parts and took them
to Mexico City where he assembled the watches, stamped "Bulova"
on them, and sold them. This was lawful in Mexico, 21 but these
watches eventually "found" their way into the United States
where they were in competition with the plaintiff's Bulova watch
business in this country. The court issued an injunction against
the American's acts in Mexico. Although the acts were lawful
there, their effect continued on into the United States where they
constituted unlawful competition. The continuing lawful acts be-
came unlawful when they caused injury to the plaintiff in this
country.
With such suggestions in mind, an examination of Babcock
and related cases will now be made. The case was decided in
1963, after the decisions just discussed. The Jacksons took Miss
20344 U.S. 280 (1952). See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213
U.S. 347 (1909). The complaint charged the defendant with monopoly of the
banana import trade and, with the instigation of the Costa Rican government,
conspiracy to seize plaintiff's plantation in Panama. The Court held that a
violation of American laws coul not be grounded on a foreign nation's sovereign
acts. It is submitted that the case reached the wrong result; it was criticized by
the majority of law review articles at that time.
21 Although the defendant registered the trademark "Bulova" under Mexican
law, the Mexican courts nullified the registration before final disposition in the
United States. However, this should have no effect on the result. A state can
enjoin its own citizens from acts, though valid where committed, if they have
an unlawful effect within the borders of the state. The injunction is directed
against the person.
1967]
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Babcock in their automobile on a weekend trip to Canada. While
Mr. Jackson was driving in Ontario, the car ran off the highway
and Miss Babcock was seriously injured. She brought an action in
New York alleging negligence in the operation of the automobile.
Since Ontario's guest statute barred recovery, the defendant moved
to dismiss on the ground that there was no cause of action at the
place where the injury occurred. The New York appellate court,
however, basing its precedent-shattering opinion on the reasoning
that New York had "the most significant contacts with the matter
in dispute," applied New York law and allowed recovery. The
decision has been acclaimed by some judges, primarily in New
York and Pennsylvania, and by a majority, perhaps, of law school
professors and commentators. However, it has been followed in
only a few states and remains distinctly the minority rule. The
main reasoning of the court in Babcock is stated as follows:
Comparison of the relative "contacts" and "interests" of New
York anq Ontario in this litigation, vis-a-vis the issue here
presented, makes-it clear that the concern of New York is
unquestionably the greater and more direct and that the
interest of Ontario is at least minimal. The present action in-
volves injuries sustained by a New York guest as the result of
the negligence of a New York host in the operation of an
automobile garaged, licensed and undoubtedly insured in
New York, in the course of a week-end journey which began
and was to end there. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole re-
lationship with the occurrence is the purely adventitious cir-
cumstance that the accident occurred there 22
Perhaps the most objectionable feature of the rule in Babcock
is the uncertainty of its application. Judges hearing a case in New
York may well decide that the "center of gravity" is in New York;
judges adjudicating the same case in Kentucky might just as well
decide it is in Kentucky. The rule is almost certain to result in
too much slanting of decisions towards the plaintiff's side. Such
subjective determination of the rights of the parties causes not
only uncertainty but injustice before the law. It will cause clients
to choose the forum that will be most favorable towards them.
Sparks, a practicing attorney, who has written a vigorous criticism
of the case, says that the decision is "wholly indefensible." He
believes that the decision
22 12 N.Y.2d 473, 483, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 742, 750 (1963).
[Vol. 56,
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will throw the law governing torts into a state of utter con-
fusion, will bring forth a hodge podge of decisions based
neither upon rhyme nor reason, will breed uncertainty, will
enlarge forum shopping by the parties, will increase pro-
vincialism throughout the federalized country and will allow
recovery solely that one might recover. 3
Those who were dissatisfied with the historic rule might well
have found a stronger case upon which to ground a change. In
Babcock, both the unlawful conduct (negligence) and the injury
occurred outside of New York; in fact, they both occurred in
Ontario. If the conduct and injury both occurred in Ontario, it
is hard to argue that the most substantial factors occurred in New
York in light of the fact that conduct and injury are ordinarily
considered the two most important factors in a multi-state tort
case. The inconsistency inherent in the New York decision is
indicated by the fact that if this suit had been brought in Ontario
instead of New York, and the Babcock rule had been applied
there, it is quite possible that the court would have held that
Ontario was the place of most significant relationship and applied
its own law.24
It is occasionally suggested that Babcock is an insurance rather
than a tort case. However, the result, in the light of fundamental
insurance principles, is clearly erroneous. The purpose of an
insurance contract is to stand between the insured and liability.25
If there is no liability, there should be no payment of insurance.
In Babcock, there was no liability under accepted conflicts tort
principles. So the court created new law to make the insurance
company liable. This may be advantageous to the injured plain-
tiff, but its net result is to raise insurance premiums for other
persons who have insurance with the company.26 It may be safely
inferred that this result was by no means contemplated by any of
the parties to the insurance contract.
2 3 Spark, Babcock v. Jackson-A Practicing Attorney's Reflections Upon the
Opinion and its Implications, 31 INs. COUNSF_. J. 428 (1964). See also Curtin,
The Babcock Case-Present and Future Impact on Tort-Conflict of Laws, 33 I~s.
CONSEL J. 242 (1966).24 But see Professor Reese's comment, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A
Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLUin. L. REV. 1212, 1256 (1963).
25W. VANCEc, INSURANCEn § 10 (3d ed. 1951).
-2 Profesor Currie states that Babcock will not raise insurance rates in
Ontario. That is true, but ;t will raise insurance rates in New York! It changes
New York law, thus adding to an insurance company's liability there. Comments
on Babcock v . Jackson, supr'a note 24, at 1238.
1967]
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Running through the cases which are similar in result to Bab-
cock is constanttalk of the interest of the various states involved in
the cases. Thus, in Schmidt,27 the court held the Minnesota statute
applicable partly on the reasoning that it was the purpose of the
statute to punish Minnesota dram shop keepers who sold liquor
to intoxicated persons. What has that to do with the defendant's
liability for the tort injury -in Wisconsin? "Punish" is a word
properly found on the criminal side of the docket and has nothing
to do with a tort injury, unless it is a case involving punitive
damages.
Professor Currie has also stressed the idea of considering the
interests -of the several states in the determination of liability in
these multi-state tort cases.2 8 Thus, Babcock is rationalized in
terms of New York's interest in enforcing liability since the parties
are New York residefits. This, it is submitted, is wrong. What we
have in Babcock is a suit between private parties, to which the
state is not a party. Objective conflicts torts principles should be
applied. More and more, society in the United States moves to-
ward the enforcement of state interests as such, rather than the
individual rights of private parties although, admittedly there is
public policy behind all law. The law in this country (supposedly)
serves the citizen, not the state. What is good for General Motors
may or may not be good for the country, but certainly what is
good for the state is not necessarily good for its citizens. It is the
function of the state to furnish courts and procedures for the
enforcement of private rights in civil cases. The point attempted
to be made is not easy, but the fact undoubtedly is that more and
more the law and policy serve the interests of the state rather
than the individual. A re-assertion of private rights and obliga-
tions is needed in this country. The state and federal trends are
only too apparent.
While Babcock has not been generally followed, except by
professorial commentators, there are several cases subscribing to
its rule. A leading one is Griffith v. United Air Lines,29 a Penn-
sylvania case decided in 1964. It repudiated the place of injury
rule in favor of the "more flexible" principle in Babcock which
27 Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
28 Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 24, at 1242-43.
29203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964).
[Vol. 56,
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permits a weighing of the interests of the various states involved.
The judge in the Griffith case wrote an exhaustive opinion in
which he relied heavily on a North Carolina case.30 That case in-
volved an action brought against a Pennsylvania insurance com-
pany for negligent delay in acting upon an application for life
insurance. Pennsylvania law, which denied such an action, was
applied. The court so held because Pennsylvania had "the most
significant relationships with events constituting the alleged tort
and with the parties." 31 One might challenge the conclusion that
Pennsylvania was the state of most significant relationships in this
case. Another judge might well decide that under all the facts and
circumstances, North Carolina was the center of gravity.32 The
decision is a good illustration of the subjectiveness of the Bab-
cock rule.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in a five to two decision,
adopted the Babcock rule in 1967.33 The parties to the suit were
Kentucky residents involved in an accident in Indiana. The plain-
tiff was riding in the defendant's car when the negligence of her
host caused an accident. Kentucky law permits a guest to sue a
negligent host, but Indiana law does not. The Court found
Kentucky to be the state of the most significant contact with the
suit and applied Kentucky law. It is submitted that the case reach-
ed the wrong result since, as in Babcock, the unlawful conduct
and injury both occurred in Indiana. This should make Indiana
the state of the most significant contact with the accident. The
fact that the parties were residents of and domiciled in Kentucky
seems of relatively less importance.
A recent case following stare decisis and applying the historic
rule is Shaw v. Lee,34 a North Carolina decision. In that case, a
wife was allegedly injured while riding as a guest with her
husband in Virginia. They were residents of North Carolina.
North Carolina law would allow her an action; Virginia law
would not. The court applied Virginia law, stating that some
30 Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
319 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1963). See also Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617
(7th Cir. 1965).
31 Lowies North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
319 F.2d 469, 473-74 (4th Cir. 1963).
32 Compare the factors pro and con. Id. at 474.
33 Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
3 4 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
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jurisdictions would allow the plaintiff an action but that North
Carolina preferred to follow stare decisis and did not "deem it wise
to voyage into such an unchartered sea, leaving behind well
established conflict of laws rules." 35 In a similar Kansas case,36 the
decedent was fatally injured in an automobile collision in Mis-
souri. A wrongful death action was brought in Kansas by his ad-
ministratrix. The decedent and all parties to the action were
residents of Kansas, but the Supreme Court of Kansas held that
the rights of the parties were governed by Missouri law.
In a 1966 New York case, Kell v. Henderson,37 the parties and
their guest were all domiciled in and residents of Ontario. The
alleged negligent operation of the automobile and the injury
occurred in New York. Kell reached a result that would seem con-
trary to the Babcock decision. It held that the law of the state of
injury was the law of the case, and that the guest had a cause of
action in New York for injuries occurring in that state whether
those involved were residents or domiciliaries of that state or not.
It is believe1 that Kell was correctly decided and cases like Bab-
cock and Wessling were not. All three cases involved unlawful
conduct and injury occurring in the same state. Where the conduct
and injury occur in the same state, the Restatement Second takes
the position that "the local law of that state usually determines
the rights and liabilities of the parties."38 Kell holds that domicile
and residence do not cause as much "significant relationship" as
"conduct and injury."
An indirect effect of Kell is that it repudiates the argument of
those who would say that such decisions are insurance cases and
should be decided according to the insurance interests of the states
involved. In Kell, the parties were residents of, and domiciled in,
Ontario. Consequently, the automobile that was involved in the
accident was presumably licensed, garaged, and insured there. So
it might have been argued that Ontario's insurance interests
should have determined the choice of law. But the court decided
otherwise, and correctly, holding with the view of the Restatement
Second that the law of the state of both unlawful conduct and
35 Id. at -, 129 S.E.2d at 293.86 McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965).
37 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966).3 8 RESTATE MNT, supra note 15, at § 379(2) (b).
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injury was the law of the case, without any mention of Ontario's
insurance interests. If, then, Kell is correctly decided, it is ap-
parent that Babcock is not since in Babcock, the conduct and in-
jury were both in Ontario. So, although Babcock gave rise to the
important "significant relationship" doctrine, the decision itself
does not satisfy the court's own test and reaches a holding mani-
festly erroneous on the facts.
Courts which have not accepted the Babcock rule have not,
generally speaking, made any attempt to rebut the reasoning be-
hind it. They have been largely content to point out the un-
certainties in the new rule and rely on stare decisis. One who
wishes to differ with the Babcock rationale must for the most part
glean his reasoning from decisions prior to the case, sometimes
many years prior. However, one limitation is developing in de-
cisions that might otherwise apply the new rule. This limitation
amounts to an interpretation of the word "fortuitous." One ob-
jection to the place of injury rule is that the parties were often
only "fortuitously" in the state of injury, i.e., that they were only
passing through, and that most of the factors of the case were as-
sociated with another state or states. Several recent cases have
stated that "fortuitous," in the legal sense, means that the parties
involved in the multi-state tort had not "come to rest" in the
state where the injury occurred.
The leading case applying the "come to rest" limitation is
Dym v. Gordon,39 a New York decision. In that case a New York
passenger brought suit against a New York host for injuries sus-
tained during a trip that began and ended in Colorado. Both
parties were temporarily residing in Colorado. A divided New
York Court of Appeals concluded that the Colorado guest statute
controlled. The majority applied what they conceived to be the
Babcock rule, but they concluded that the accident "arose out of
Colorado based activity" since the parties were at the time
temporarily residing in Colorado.40 Judge Fuld, who had written
the majority opinion in Babcock, joined in a dissent on the ground
that the "center of gravity," as in Babcock, was in New York.41
39 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
40 See Chappell, Lex Loci Delecti and Babcock v. Jackson, , Wm. & MAY L.
REv. 249, 254 (1966).
41 16 N.Y.2d 120, 128-29, 209 N.E.2d 792, 797, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 470
(1965).
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The majority opinion, however, pointed out that in Babcock "the
parties were in transitu."
'42
The "come to rest" limitation on Babcock is discussed at some
length in an excellent Note43 in the Kentucky Law Journal. The
commentator, in the course of his discussion, uses a number of
illustrative situations to point up the limitation. He suggests that
the traveling party has come to rest, for example, if the injury
occurs during the course of a several weeks vacation at a parti-
cular place, or during the course of a week-end fishing or hunting
trip. He suggests that if a party should go from Kentucky across
the river to Cincinnati, Ohio, for a one day shopping trip, that
an injury in Ohio during the day would be "fortuitous." From
that illustration he moves on to suggest that in any stop for
more than twenty-four hours the party would have "come to rest."
This might be questionable under some circumstances. The point
is that "coming to rest" is a matter of time and degree and while
lawyers may differ as to applying the limitation in a particular
case, it is submitted that this limitation is reasonable and valid
and a marked step toward a refinement of the Babcock rule. It
is a move toward objectivity.
CONCLUSION
No problem in the law is currently more difficult than choice
of law in multi-state tort cases. The many courts that have faced
the problem have applied numerous conflicting theories in their
opinions. Commentators are in equal conflict and confusion. In
such a situation it is difficult to make specific suggestions. How-
ever, this article has been critical of the new "center of gravity"
rule, and it is felt that something specific should be offered. The
Restatement Second has offered a formula for the determination
of the law to be applied in such cases. That formula is a compro-
mise; it embodies the historic place of injury rule, the place of
conduct, domicile and related factors, and the "center of gravity"
(Babcock) rule. This formula provides:
§ 379. The General Principle.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in
42 Id. at 125-26, 209 N.E.2d at 795, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467-68.
43 Note, supra note 3.
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determining the state of most significant relationship in-
clude:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct occurred,
(c) the domicile, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between
the parties is centered.
The Restatement Second has also categorized various specific
tort situations which do not come within the personal injury rule
and for which separate formulas are provided.44 Case law is doing
this also. Whether it is advisable to have separate rules and cate-
gories may well be questioned, but that matter is grist for a long
discussion, much longer than the limits of this article.
The Restatement Second, in section 379 (1), provides that the
local law of the state which has the most significant relationship
with the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights
and liabilities in tort. This is practically a restatement of Bab-
cock, and if the formula ended there, the writer would be much
opposed to it. However, section 379 (2) also attempts a break-down
of the important contacts that the forum will consider in de-
termining the state of most significant relationship. These factors
will be discussed in turn:
1. The place where the injury occurred-This factor standing
alone is, of course, the sole factor employed under the historic
rule in determining choice of law in conflicts tort cases. What is
its weight under the Restatement Second? One can obtain a def-
inite and specific answer to that question in section 379a (2), which
provides:
§ 379a. Personal Injuries.
(2) When the actor's conduct and the personal injury occur
in different states, the local law of the state where the injury
occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties,
unless it appears that some other state has a more significant
44The Restatement Second has at least seven sub-sections of different rules
in separate categories of actionable wrongs depending upon the type of wrong.
RIEsTATrMENT, supra note 15.
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relationship with the occurrence and the parties, in which
event the local law of the latter state will govern.
45
Thus, the law of the place of injury is the law of the case
unless it appears that some other state has a more significant
relationship. In other words, the law of the place of injury is the
law of the case, subject only to certain exceptions. So the historic
rule remains the fundamental factor in determining choice of
law. Consequently, the Restatement Second would not advocate a
complete following of Babcock but an acceptance of the growing
feeling that the historic rule is an oversimplification which does
not adequately provide for "exceptional" circumstances. It is on.
that basis the writer accepts the Restatement formula, with some
reservations.
The inadequacies of the place of injury rule can be partly
cured by extending and broadening recognized legal principles.
For example, desirable results can be obtained by the application
of the contifiuing act principle in cases like Schmidt and Steele.46
One reason for the birth of Babcock was the ineptness of the
courts in failing to broaden the place of injury rule in multi-state
situations even though ours is a society with more and more
inter-state communication. Too often the courts applied the place
of injury rule narrowly and without imagination. Flexibility is
needed in the law.
The new "come to rest" limitation on Babcock will throw a
number of cases that would otherwise be decided under the
"center of gravity" approach back into the "place of injury"
category. This limitation on Babcock indicates the possibilities of
refinement, not only as to the "most significant contacts" part of
the Restatement Second's formula, but as to other portions of the
formula as well. The thoughtless use of stare decisis is on the way
out in conflict of laws. Judges are turning their attention to actual
solutions of conflicts problems. The utilization of the "come to
rest" rule is illustrative of creative energy thoughtfully applied.
The New York courts are primarily responsible for the judicial
creation of Babcock; they are also largely responsible for the rea-
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcT OF LAws § 379a(2) (Tent. Draft
No. 8, 1963).
46 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
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sonable "come to rest" limitation on the rule. Further refinements
of the choice of law formula may be expected.
2. The place where the conduct occurred-The place where
the conduct occurred has not, in the past, been controlling in
determining the choice of law. Instead, the place of injury has
governed. Fundamentally, this is because a tort is an injury for
which compensation should be paid. 1 If there is no injury, no
compensation should be paid; the conduct, even though it may
be blameworthy, is non-tortious. This is not true on the criminal
side. Recklessness may be a crime without injury. This is because
crime is a public offense and the state desires that dangerous con-
duct be deterred. But on the civil side the plaintiff is not the
--state but a private citizen, and he has no business in a civil court
asking for compensation unless he has been injured.
All this does not change the fact that the courts, particularly in
recent years, have begun to struggle ivith the problem of the
relation of conduct to choice of law.48 .A-Imst ifivarably they have
approached the problem indirectly. Schmidt and similar cases are
confusing in their reasoning. Many of these cases, where the
conduct occurred in one state and the resulting *injury in another,
can be solved most logically by an application of the "continuing
act" principle. If A lights a squib in state X and throws it across
the line into state Y where it explodes and injures B, A should be
held liable under the law of state X if state Y does not have a
law making him liable.
The Restatement Second has suggested what amounts to new
law in exceptional cases where conduct, as such, may be the
decisive factor in choice of law.49 There may be those who would
argue that this provision is not new law. But fundamentally it
is new law; the provision is a distinct addition to, and change in,
the law which is to be applied in certain exceptional cases. The
writer is in accord with the insertion of conduct as a determinative
factor in such cases where it is logical and reasonable to do so. The
same result may be reached in some of these cases by the use of
the continuing act principle and perhaps some other devices; but
it is believed that the inclusion of conduct, as such, in the deter-
4 7 PROSSER § 80.
48 See 2 F. H-RPER & F. J ms, supra note 2.
49 REsTrTE-, r, supra note 15, at § 379, Comment b.
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mination of the law in certain cases is a forward step and
strengthens the Restatement Second formula.
However, new departures should be used cautiously and
thoughtfully. This is new; what are the kinds of situations where
the provision should or should not be applied? The restaters'
Comment 0 on the provision attempts to meet this question by
suggesting several specific illustrative situations. It points out that
where the conduct and injury occur in the same state, the local
law of that state almost invariably determines the law of the case.
The Comment then moves on to state that "situations may, how-
ever, arise, where although conduct and injury occur in the same
state, some other state has the most significant relationship with
the occurrence and the parties and is therefore the state of
governing law." 51 The situation given is where the plaintiff, who
is domiciled in state X, purchases a ticket there from the defendant
airline, which is incorporated and has its principal place of busi-
ness in X, for a flight from one point in X to another point in
X. A straight line between these points runs for a short distance
over the territory of Y. While over Y the pilot is negligent and
the plane loses an engine, causing the plaintiff to be badly
frightened. Here the conduct and injury both occurred over
Y but, according to the Comment, X is the state of most signi-
ficant relationship.52 Hard cases make difficult decisions. The
writer is no friend of domicile as a decisive element, particularly
if the plaintiff was not also a resident of X. If this suit were in
Y, the court might apply the law of Y. At any rate, the formula
provides a framework within which to examine the facts.
The Restatement struggles through several pages of Comment
and illustrations to draw the lines for the incorporation of "con-
duct" into the formula for the determination of choice of law.
One may not agree with the entire Comment or with all of the
conclusions in the illustrations, but they are most helpful in
arriving at a semblance of exactness and certainty of decision. It
is this kind of precise thinking that will gradually but definitely
result in applying the new element "conduct" in a satisfactory
50Id. at § 379(a), Comment e.
5' Id.
52 See also id. at Comment f.
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manner to help determine the law of the case in a conflicts torts
situation.
3. The domicile, nationality, place of incorporation and place
of business-This subdivision of the formula troubles the writer.
It embodies a goodly portion of the Babcock principle. A number
of cases have relied upon one or another of these enumerated
elements. Particularly, the writer is no friend of "domicile" as a
determinative choice of law factor. Its use in the migratory divorce
is a thing of reproach to the law. One remembers the prominent
eastern wife who went to Nevada for a quick divorce and who was
specifically asked by the judge if she intended to make Nevada her
home. She answered, "Yes." Then the judge asked, "Do you intend
to stay in Nevada permanently?" Again she answered, "Yes." The
judge gave her a divorce and within an hour she was on a plane
and on her way back to New York. The writer does not know
the answer to the migratory divorce but certainly the application
of "bona fide domicile" in such cases is an abomination in the
law and a discredit to the legal profession.
Nor has the writer found "domicile" a very helpful factor in
other conflicts problems, e.g., as a basis of jurisdiction. If a de-
fendant is domiciled in X but working for six months in Y, five
hundred miles away, it is not satisfactory to force him to return
to X to defend a suit. Of course, there are arguments on the
other side.53 Domicile is a very vague word anyway, hard to define
and hard to apply. "Residence" is a more satisfactory word, but
"residence" is a venue term.
Yet there is an increasing tendency to use "domicile" as a
factor in the determination of choice of law. The Restatement
Second uses the factor of domicile in illustrations and discussions
in several of the sub-sections to Section 379, e.g., those pertaining
to fraud and misrepresentation, defamation, and right of privacy.
Each of these could be considered at length, but the choice of
law in intra-family immunity cases will be the only situation dis-
cussed, for it embraces situations that have caused confusion and
difference of opinion in conflicts for a long time.
The writer found considerable pleasure in applying the
53 See Moreland, Conflict of Laws-A Rationale of Jurisdiction, 54 Ky. L.J.
171, 178 (1966).
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technicalities of the vested rights theory to some of these earlier
marital torts cases. For example, take the debatable question
raised in Buckeye v. Buckeye.54 The plaintiff was allegedly injured
by the defendant's negligent driving in Illinois. Subsequently the
parties married. By the law of Illinois, marriage extinguished the
right of action. But marriage did not extinguish the right of action
in Wisconsin, the state to which the parties had moved. The Wis-
consin court applied Illinois law. If the vested rights theory is
applied to the case, it is easy to justify the decision. The plaintiff
had a cause of action in Illinois, but marriage extinguished it.
This is the type of situation that jolts those who would follow
the place of injury rule in all cases. To apply the rule makes the
decision simple and certain. To those who do not like the result
one can say, "But that is the law." But to say it is the law is not
enough. Is it good law? Some subsequent cases have not thought
so. In fact, Buckeye itself has been overruled in Wisconsin by
Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Company.55 That case held
that in torte cases where one spouse sues the other, the law to be
applied is that of the state of domicile. A number of other states
are now coming to the same conclusion. Stumberg looks with
considerable favor on the emerging rule,58 but the discussions and
cases are by no means in accord on the matter.57 The Restatement
Second cites cases supporting domicile as the basis of choice of
law in such situations. 8
Somewhat conversely, the Restatement Second repudiates
domicile as the basis for choice of law in the somewhat similar
situations of alienation of affections and loss of consortium, and
chooses the place of injury as the criterion in line with recent
cases in this category.5 9 The leading case is Gordon v. Parker.60 In
that celebrated case the husband sued the defendant for aliena-
tion of his wife's affections. The spouses had lived in Pennsylvania.
The wife was induced to cohabit with the defendant in Mas-
54203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931). See also Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82,
174 A. 508 (1934).
557 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
56 G. STUMBERG, PRmCImL oF CoNFLicr oF LAws 205-06 (3d ed. 1963).
57See H. GOODmiC, CoNmiar OF LAws § 82 and n. 19 (4th ed. 1964).
5 8 RESTATEMEN, supra note 15, at § 379, Explanatory Notes at p. 18.
59 Id. at 17.
0 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949), afF'd 178 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1949.)
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sachusetts. There was a cause of action under Massachusetts law
but not Pennsylvania, the matrimonial domicile. The court chose
to apply the law of Massachusetts after weighing the relative
interests of the two states. This is somewhat specious, since the
husband had not been in Massachusetts and the place of matri-
monial domicile was Pennsylvania. However, it is believed that
the decision is correct even though it is somewhat difficult to de-
fine the technical reasons. Undoubtedly the place of injury was
Massachusetts, but injury to what? To the husband's consortium?
The writer is not too impressed by the interest of the state of
Massachusetts in the husband's action. The question is the
husband's injury, not Massachusetts' interest in punishing the de-
fendant in a civil action.
The inclusion of domicile, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business as possible factors in the choice of law in
torts cases is in line with discussions and holdings in current
cases. It will broaden and extend the existing law. It will not bring -
immediate uniformity, but it will, as in other portions of the
Restatement, give a formula of specific statement if not of uniform
application. As time passes, it will result in -more predictable
prophecy as to choice of law in such cases after the courts and the
commentators have had an opportunity to further refine and re-
form it.
4. The place where the relationship, if any, between the part-
ies is centered-Where there is a relationship between the parties
and when the injury is caused by an act done in the course of the
relationship, the place where the relationship is centered is
another factor to be considered in determining the choice of law.
Thus, if a passenger is injured on a train, the place where the
relationship is centered may be the state of governing law. In
rare cases the place of the seat of the relationship may outweigh
all other factors in choice of law. Thus, if the plaintiff purchases
a train ticket to ride from X to Y in state A, but is injured while
the train is passing for a short distance through state B, the law of
A rather than B will likely govern. However, this factor must be
weighed with others in reaching a conclusion.61
61 REsTATEmEmr, supra note 15, at § 379, Comment b.
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SUMMATION
It may be said with finality that the determination of choice
of law in torts cases on the basis of the place of injury is an over-
simplification and inadequate under modem conditions of inter-
state travel and communication. The place of injury rule can be
extended and broadened by the use of the continuing act principle
and other technical devices, but these are not sufficient. The cases
and commentators are in confusion on the matter. In such a
situation, the formula provided by the Restatement Second, Con-
flict of Laws, in Section 379 offers something rational on the
whole and reasonably specific. Further refinement by the courts
and commentators will be needed to clarify and improve the
formula. The "come to rest" limitation now developing in New
York is an illustration of this type of refinement. Continuing
thought and discussion will bring others.
